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Abstract 
Feminist attempts to empower women within their own cultural traditions have 
employed two broad strategies: authentic choice and participation. This paper argues 
that the methodological problems that beset the authentic choice strategy tell in favour 
of the participation approach. However, proponents of the participation strategy have 
failed to pay sufficient attention to the background conditions that need to be met if 
women are to make effective use of the institutional mechanisms their models 
advocate. If women are to be effective political agents at least some of the most 
serious structural inequalities that women face must be addressed. A nuanced 
statement of the participation strategy must therefore take account of long-standing 
feminist concerns regarding economic equality and access to resources. While this 
approach falls short of the demanding conditions for democratic citizenship implicit 
in the authentic choice strategy, it none the less places significant limits on the scope 
of participatory strategies and links the goal of empowering women within their own 
cultural traditions to wider feminist struggles to secure greater economic equality for 
women in general.  
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Empowering Minority Women: Autonomy versus Participation 
 
Recent feminist discourses regarding gender equality and cultural justice have focused 
on the need to empower minority women within their own cultural traditions. Here it 
is helpful to distinguish between two broad strategies: authentic choice and 
participation. While the former conceives of empowering women in terms of their 
capacity to control their lives and to exercise choice, the latter focuses on the need to 
ensure that women are properly represented in decision and policy-making 
procedures. Both strategies identify potentially important aspects of empowerment. 
However,  the difficulties that beset even sophisticated versions of the authentic 
choice strategy,  such as Martha Nussbaum‟s (1999) capability approach and Marilyn 
Friedman‟s (2003) consent-based model, point to significant methodological 
problems inherent in any appeal to conditions of choice as a strategy for empowering 
women within their own cultural traditions. In the light of such concerns feminists 
may find it helpful to shift their focus from attempts to define the background 
conditions that enable women to freely endorse or reject existing cultural roles and 
practices to the political processes that define and articulate these cultural roles and 
expectations. While the participation strategy proposed by writers such as Monique 
Deveaux (2006) and Aylet Shachar (2001) promises to provide new institutional 
mechanisms that enable women to challenge prevailing cultural roles and power 
relations, both Deveaux and Shachar struggle to define the background conditions that 
need to be met for women to make effective use of the opportunities for participation 
and voice that their models aim to facilitate. These difficulties point to the need for a 
more nuanced and carefully delineated statement of the participation strategy. In line 
with Nancy Fraser‟s (2003) call for feminists to reconnect discourses regarding 
recognition and representation with long-standing concerns relating to social and 
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economic equality, this paper argues that vulnerable group members such as women 
will only be able to make effective use of the opportunities to participate in decision-
making if serious structural inequalities such as a lack of education and economic 
deprivation are addressed. This analysis suggests that an effective strategy for 
empowering minority women needs to incorporate a redistributive dimension in 
addition to the concerns with recognition and representation that inform the models 
proposed by Deveaux and Shachar. While this approach falls well short of the rather 
demanding conditions for democratic participation implicit in the authentic choice 
model, it none the less places more significant limits on the scope of participatory 
strategies than proponents of this approach acknowledge. It also links these struggles 
to wider feminist discourses regarding better access to resources for women in 
general.  
 
Empowerment as ‘authentic choice’ 
Martha Nussbaum‟s capability approach and Marylin Friedman‟s consent based 
model constitute probably the two most prominent examples of the authentic choice 
strategy. While both Nussbaum and Friedman regard respect for women‟s actual 
choices, values and cultural attachments as important values, both stress that desires 
and preferences formed under unjust social conditions cannot be taken at face value. 
Many preferences, desires and emotions that influence the choices of individuals are 
learned in society and are shaped by social norms. Indeed, as Nussbaum (1999:11) 
notes „people usually adjust their desires to reflect the level of their available 
possibilities‟ and hence can fail to form desires for things their circumstances have 
placed out of reach. After all women frequently internalise the norms of their own 
oppression. For example, women who have been denied access to education or 
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employment outside the home „may be slow to desire these things, because they may 
not know what they are like or what they could possibly mean in lives like theirs‟ 
(Nussbaum, 1999:11). Indeed, unjust or oppressive social conditions „may deform the 
nature of a person‟s concern for herself‟ and may lead her „to value or seek the very 
person or circumstances that keep her in oppressive conditions‟ (Friedman, 2003:19). 
From this perspective a feminism that seeks to empower women within their own 
cultural tradition should first and foremost aim to secure for all women the 
background conditions that enable them to make authentic choices. On Friedman‟s 
account this entails ensuring that women have access to a „significant and morally 
acceptable array of alternatives‟, are „able to make choices relatively free from 
coercion, manipulation and deception‟, and have the opportunity „to develop, early in 
life, the capacities needed to reflect on their situations and make decisions about 
them‟ (Friedman 2003:188). On this account for choices to be authentic they must 
accord with the deeper wants and commitments that an agent has freely and self-
reflectively endorsed. Similarly for Nussbaum (1999:46) 
„a woman‟s affiliation with a certain group or culture should not be taken as 
normative for her unless, on due consideration, with all her capabilities at her 
disposal, she makes the norm her own‟.  
 
Crucial in this regard is Nussbaum‟s emphasis on autonomy and critical reason in 
clause 6 of her list of capabilities. Thus to be able to make informed choices women 
must be allowed to develop their capacity for practical reason, so that they can 
„engage in critical reflection about the planning‟ of their own lives (Nussbaum, 
1999:41). 
 
While this emphasis on choice places Nussbaum and Friedman within a broadly 
liberal paradigm, both stress that their approaches are compatible with a wide variety 
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of ways of life, including traditional non-liberal conceptions of the good. Thus, 
Friedman argues that her conception of content-neutral autonomy only requires that 
the background conditions for autonomous choice are met and does not demand that 
the content of what is chosen is itself consistent with the ideal of autonomy. 
Autonomy does not require a rejection of or distancing from one‟s traditions and 
attachments. Indeed, „even preferences formed under oppressive social conditions can 
be the basis of autonomous behaviour if they represent what someone reaffirms as 
deeply important to her upon reflective considerations and she is able to act 
effectively on these concerns‟ (Friedman 2003:25). Hence for Friedman (2003:191) 
„the consent of women in a minority culture to their own cultural practices that seem 
to violate their rights provides, on the face of it, a significant degree of justification 
for the cultural practices in question, so long as that consent is content-neutrally 
autonomous‟. Similarly Nussbaum stresses that her approach is compatible with a 
plurality of comprehensive doctrines of the good and respects the decisions of women 
to lead a wide variety of lives, perfecting some capabilities and capacities while 
neglecting others. Therefore, although Nussbaum (1999:70/1) believes that anti-
liberal feminists are unwise to „jettison the liberal account of human essence in favour 
of an account that gives more centrality to “accidental” features such as religion or 
class or even gender‟, she stresses that her approach „strives to leave space for these 
other identities‟. 
 
Yet, despite these claims, it remains doubtful whether the authentic choice strategy 
favoured by Nussbaum and Friedman can indeed provide a basis for empowering 
women that is compatible with the respectful recognition of cultural norms. Much of 
the debate in this regard has focused on whether or not Nussbaum‟s and Friedman‟s 
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emphasis on critical reflection entails criteria for authentic choice which are 
ultimately too demanding.
1
 These concerns have given rise to a lively debate on how 
best to define the criteria for authentic choice. However, the tensions inherent in 
Nussbaum‟s distinction between capabilities and functioning and Friedman‟s 
differentiation between content-neutral and substantive autonomy arguably point 
towards more deep-seated methodological problems that are liable to compromise any 
appeal to the conditions of choice as a strategy for empowerment. As both Nussbaum 
and Friedman recognise, if the authentic choice strategy is to avoid the dangers of 
simply privileging liberal concerns and pre-occupations, it is vital to draw a clear 
distinction between the pre-requisites required to exercise choice and the substance or 
content of the options that individuals adopt. After all, if the authentic choice strategy 
is to be compatible with the respectful recognition of cultural norms, women must be 
free to choose a wide variety of lives, including cultural roles that minimise 
autonomy. Indeed, Nussbaum‟s desire to clearly differentiate between capabilities and 
functioning and Friedman‟s distinction between content-neural and substantive 
autonomy are both attempts to separate the exercise of authentic choice from the 
substance or content of what is chosen. Thus, according to Nussbaum, her list of 
capabilities is best understood as a „list of opportunities for life functioning‟ and does 
not require that citizens act in certain valued ways or pursue a particular conception of 
the good. However, while this distinction between capabilities and functioning is 
theoretically impeccable, in practice it is difficult to sustain. After all, in practice 
„freedom cannot be easily observed unless it has been exercised‟ 
(Deneulin.2002:502).
2
  Consequently, often the most effective way of assessing 
whether a government has succeeded in providing citizens with the opportunity to 
develop all their core capabilities is to look at actual functioning. If, for instance, 
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women refuse to go to literacy classes offered to them, it will be difficult to determine 
whether this reflects a free choice or is based upon internalised social norms and 
expectations regarding the status of women.  Therefore, in practice the most readily 
accessible way of evaluating the effectiveness of a literacy programme is to look at 
the actual number of women who have learned to read. Nussbaum‟s persistent 
scepticism regarding the choices of women who endorse a life-style that limits their 
autonomy and her tendency to portray such preferences as signs of continued 
subordination and adaptive preference formation arguably reflect, at least in part, this 
slippage between capabilities and functioning.
3
  
 
Friedman‟s distinction between substantive and content-neutral conceptions of 
autonomy gives rise to similar difficulties. Although only substantive accounts of 
autonomy require that the content of what is chosen is compatible with the ideal of 
autonomy, in practice the difficulties inherent in assessing whether or not the 
conditions for content-neutral autonomy have been met are liable to give rise to a 
slippage whereby only those choices that also approximate the ideal of substantive 
autonomy are recognised as procedurally autonomous. After all not only is it difficult 
to reliably assess in how far a person who continues to uphold traditional practices has 
critically reflected upon these traditions and is fully aware of alternatives, many forms 
of manipulation, coercion and deception are subtle and often difficult to quantify. As 
Friedman (2003:191/192) herself recognises „the choices of women that deserve 
default respect are those made under conditions promoting the women‟s content-
neutral autonomy‟ and there is liable to be much „debate over what promotes or 
impedes autonomy in practice‟. Because it may be difficult to establish whether 
women who continue to endorse traditional practices and life-styles genuinely had the 
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opportunity to develop a more autonomous life, there is a danger that only the 
rejection of such a life-style will be taken as conclusive proof that the women indeed 
had, in Nussbaum‟s language the opportunity to develop the relevant capabilities or in 
Friedman‟s terms enjoyed the conditions for the exercise of procedural autonomy. 
Thus, in practice advocates of the authentic choice strategy may find it difficult to 
respect women‟s freedom to continue to endorse their traditional way of life and not 
to avail themselves of certain opportunities. Ultimately the authentic choice strategy is 
liable to continue to privilege typically liberal pre-occupations, choices and ways of 
life. 
 
In the light of these difficulties feminists who seek to empower women within their 
own cultural traditions may find it helpful to shift their focus from the background 
conditions that enable women to freely endorse or reject existing cultural roles and 
practices to the social and political processes that define and articulate these cultural 
roles and expectations. Bearing in mind that cultural norms and roles shape the 
framework within which women act and delineate the options available to them, 
empowering women to challenge or to re-interpret the definitions of the cultural 
expectations that prevail within their community promises to transform gender 
relations within the community as a whole. For example, given that it will be very 
difficult indeed for individual women to resist a practice such as female genital 
cutting in a social environment in which it is intricately linked to the notion of 
marriageability, the most effective way to challenge the practice may be for women to 
employ social and political forums to question this linkage and to encourage the 
community as a whole to re-consider its notions of marriageability and women‟s 
sexuality. A successful campaign to eradicate the practice of genital cutting in 
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Senegalese villages provides a good example of the extent to which changes to 
existing cultural practices can often be a collective action problem and highlights the 
importance of deliberative forums that enable those affected to explore the impact of 
current practices and to seek alternatives. In 1996 women from the village of 
Malicounda Bambara decided to campaign for the abolition of genital cutting in their 
village (Mackie 2000). The women had participated in the Tolstan basic education 
programme, which is a non-directive education programme aimed at providing „skills 
and information that help people better define and pursue their own goals‟ and which 
offers women a forum in which they „can safely engage in free and equal deliberation  
about real problems‟ (Mackie 2000:261).  Through a process of discussion and 
information the women persuaded the villagers to agree a date by which they would 
all give up the practice. The villager‟s previous adherence to the practice appears to 
have been motivated mainly by the worry that if they abandoned the practice 
unilaterally their daughters would become unmarriageable.  Given a reasonable 
assurance that others would act in the same manner, it became much easier for 
villagers to give up the practice. Moreover, the success at Malicounda Bambara 
created a snowball effect, in which „from 1997 onwards, one village after another 
collectively abandoned the practice‟ (Philips 2007:46). As this example illustrates, 
social and political forums can play a vital role in enabling women to challenge 
existing norms and practices and to persuade the community as a whole to embrace 
change. It is this focus on the social and political processes that define and articulate 
cultural norms and expectations that is central to the participation strategy. 
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Empowerment as Participation 
Advocates of the participation strategy, such as Monique Deveaux (2006) and Aylet 
Shachar (2001), seek to empower women by creating new institutional mechanisms 
that facilitate critical debate about established cultural norms and practices. In contrast 
to the normative approach favoured by advocates of the authentic choice model, 
proponents of the participation strategy argue that disputes about gender and culture 
are primarily political and thus best analysed in terms of power. Indeed tensions 
between liberal norms and many of the cultural practices that have given rise to 
concern among feminists expose not just intercultural disputes. They often also 
highlight intracultural disagreements over the interpretation, meaning and legitimacy 
of particular norms. For example, in recent years there has been considerable debate 
within Jewish and Muslim communities regarding the origin, nature and interpretation 
of the communities‟ personal and family law (Shachar 2001). For proponents of the 
participation strategy such conflicts are often strategic or political in character 
reflecting interests and power relations both within the community and between the 
community and the wider society. Consequently such disputes are best resolved via a 
pragmatic approach that focuses on practical concerns and concrete consequences.  
 
Although Deveaux and Shachar advocate quite different institutional mechanisms, 
both employ a broadly similar strategy, combining a degree of self-governance for 
minorities with mechanisms that enable traditionally marginalised and potentially 
vulnerable group members to challenge the existing power relations and dominant 
interpretations of norms and values within the group. To facilitate such challenges 
Deveaux invokes the principles of democratic deliberation, whereas Shachar employs 
the idea of joint governance. Thus, on Deveaux‟s model, conflicts about cultural 
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practices that are at odds with the norm of gender equality should be addressed 
through deliberative forums, which encourage representatives from all parties affected 
by a particular issue – including representatives from women‟s groups – to give „frank 
and concrete reasons in support of particular customs and proposals for or against 
change‟ (Deveaux 2005:349). According to Deveaux, the ensuing negotiations, 
bargaining and compromise will encourage critical refection upon the validity of 
participants‟ interests and will expose the motives of those who simply seek to 
maintain control over vulnerable members of their community. To ensure that 
potentially vulnerable group members such as women have a genuine opportunity to 
voice their concerns such deliberative processes must observe three key principles: 
non-domination, political equality and revisibility. While the principle of non-
domination aims to guarantee that traditionally marginalised group members cannot 
be silenced through pressure tactics and oppression, the principle of equality seeks to 
ensure that „”extrapolitical and endogenous forms of influence, such as power, wealth 
and pre-existing social inequalities‟ cannot impact upon democratic deliberations 
(Deveaux 2005:350). Finally, the principle of revisibility stipulates that it should 
always be possible to revisit decisions at a later date.  
 
In contrast to Deveaux‟s focus on policy formation within the political realm, Shachar 
employs a range of legal mechanisms to enable women who belong to minority 
groups whose norms differ from those encoded in state law to challenge 
discriminatory practices. Her innovative system of joint governance grants minority 
groups partial self-governance by inviting them to share jurisdiction in contested 
social arenas such as family law, criminal justice and education. At the same time her 
approach encourages both the state and the minority group to pay greater attention to 
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the interests of vulnerable constituents such as women through the institution of 
clearly delineated and pre-agreed choice options. These allow individuals whose 
interests are being systematically ignored to choose, on an issue by issue basis, 
whether to have a particular matter adjudicated by the state or the minority group. 
Thus state and minority group have to compete for the loyalties of previously 
marginalised group members. The threat of selective exit on an issue by issue basis 
enables group members who bear a disproportionate burden under current 
arrangements to seek redress without having to renounce group membership. This 
raises the „collective risks and costs of maintaining discrimination and subordination‟ 
as communities who do not respond to demands for change risk that members will 
choose to have disputed issues adjudicated by the state (Shachar 2001:125). Selective 
exit options therefore encourage groups to reinterpret and adapt existing rules and 
practices. 
 
While Deveaux and Shachar seek to develop institutional mechanisms that enable 
potentially marginalised group members to challenge existing power relations, both 
also stress that the ensuing political and legal processes must respect participants‟ 
actual values and commitments and must not preclude non-liberal outcomes. Thus, 
Shachar argues that to ensure that there are no imbalances of power, state and 
minority groups ought to enjoy broad equality of status in terms of the allocation of 
jurisdictional authority. Indeed to address potential power imbalances between the 
minority and the state, the presumptions governing the initial negotiations regarding 
the allocation of sub-matters should favour the group. This can be achieved by 
allowing the minority to set the agenda or by guaranteeing it control over its preferred 
sub-matter in at least one social arena. Most importantly, for Shachar there are no 
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constitutional essentials or fundamental liberal rights that cannot be subject to 
negotiation.
4
 Although Deveaux‟s model seeks to establish a set of pre-conditions for 
democratic deliberation, her approach also emphasises the need to respect the values 
and beliefs of members of minority groups. Thus, while Deveaux argues that 
deliberative processes must respect the principles of non-domination, political 
equality, and revisability, she stresses that her procedural account of democratic 
deliberation implies that „group members may justly reject the imposition of an a 
priori norm of equality on the terms and outcomes of political debate (Deveaux 2006: 
219). Indeed Deveaux‟s commitment to a procedural account of democratic 
deliberation together with her concrete examples of how deliberative processes can 
give rise to reforms that promote greater gender equality point to quite a minimal 
reading of the conditions for democratic participation. Such a minimal reading 
emphasises voice and the prevention of overt coercion, but does not require the 
elimination of all extrapolitical and endogenous forms of influence.  For example, 
Deveaux cites the negotiations in South Africa in the 1990s leading up to the reform 
of customary marriages. However this case arguably does not meet Deveaux‟s formal 
definition of the pre-conditions for democratic participation. Not only did the 
participation of non-elected tribal leaders not sit well with the requirement to 
eliminate extra political forms of influence, such as power, wealth and pre-existing 
social inequalities, the resistance by at least some tribal leaders to the very idea that 
women should play a greater part in decision-making in South African society 
threatened to undermine the principle of political equality.
5
  As this example suggests 
in practice the conditions for democratic deliberation envisaged by Deveaux are liable 
to be significantly less stringent than her formal definition may suggest. Indeed a 
more minimal reading of the conditions for democratic deliberation reflects a certain 
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realism about the character of actual political practices that sits well with the 
emphasis on pragmatism central to the participation strategy. After all to insist on 
eliminating the influence of all extrapolitical factors such as power, wealth and pre-
existing social inequalities would risk prescribing an over-idealised and ultimately 
overly demanding conception of political deliberation that threatens to impose upon 
cultural and religious communities conditions that are rarely, if ever, met in 
democratic deliberations in liberal societies.  
 
Deveaux‟s and Shachar‟s desire to design institutions that can facilitate non-liberal 
outcomes sits well with a genuine respect for the actual choices, values and 
commitments of minority groups and thus promises to eliminate some of the pitfalls 
that beset the autonomy approach. However, the ensuing institutional arrangements 
potentially pose considerable challenges for vulnerable group members. If state and 
minority are to be equal partners and if extrapolitical and endrogenous forms of 
influence cannot be entirely eliminated from formal political deliberations, 
traditionally marginalised group members will need to be confident and vigorous in 
defence of their own interests. Only if these conditions are met will women be able to 
make effective use of institutional mechanisms such as Shachar‟s choice options or 
Deveaux‟s deliberative forums. Indeed, given the commitment to respect the existing 
values of participants, proponents of the participation strategy need to be mindful of 
the dangers of simply re-inscribing existing power relations. Therefore, both Deveaux 
and Shachar ought to give careful consideration to the background conditions that 
shape women‟s agency. Yet it is in this regard that their approach remains deeply 
troubling. 
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In an attempt to side-step the difficulties that beset attempts to cash out agency in 
terms of autonomy, Deveaux (2006: 124) proposes an account of agency that focuses 
on the indirect ways in which women in traditional communities tend to exercise 
agency through small decisions such as acts of social transgression, subversion or 
indirect resistance, such as the temporary abdication of „domestic and caretaking 
duties‟. On this account, agency constitutes „any activity or expression that signals a 
response to a prevailing social norm, custom, role or arrangement‟ which reflects or 
helps to „secure something that the person has cause to value‟ (Deveaux  
2007:153/157). Faced with the worry that an account of agency that focuses on 
indirect acts of resistance, transgression and subversion will be insufficient to tackle 
the problems associated with adaptive preferences, Deveaux (2006:93) argues that in 
liberal democracies worries about adaptive preferences have less purchase, since „the 
majority culture offers a range of life options for women, and few groups are so 
isolated that their members cannot imagine other possible lives‟. Similarly Shachar 
argues that in a liberal society the state‟s exercise of authority in its designated sub-
matters will be sufficient to ensure that women will have access to the opportunities 
and resources to develop the knowledge and to obtain the means necessary to pose a 
real threat of selective exit.  
 
Shachar and Deveaux may well be right to point to the beneficial effects of a wider 
liberal framework. However, both writers fail to consider the potential impact of their 
proposals upon the very background conditions they invoke to secure women‟s 
agency. Given the dynamics inherent in Deveaux‟s and Shachar‟s models, it is far 
from certain that once these models are implemented that the general background 
conditions will indeed remain sufficient to ensure that women from minority 
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communities would be able to develop a robust sense of agency. To mount a 
successful challenge to existing power relations entails not just an awareness of 
potential alternatives and the opportunity to participate in deliberative processes, but 
also the confidence and sense of independence to state proposals that will, at least 
initially, be resisted by the dominant factions within the minority. Arguably the 
acquisition of such skills requires, at the very least, an education system that ensures 
that all children are taught a broad range of skills and that fosters cross-cultural 
contact.  
 
Education, however, has proven to be a particularly contentious point in cross-cultural 
disputes. Education plays an important role in preserving, maintaining and 
transmitting cultural and religious values and beliefs both through direct teaching and 
through the general school ethos.  Minority communities have persistently challenged 
and resisted educational provisions that they fear may undermine their ability to 
initiate their children into the community‟s established values, traditions and norms. 
Potentially contentious issues in this area are numerous including the language of 
instruction, demands for exemptions from contested educational provisions, such as 
sex education, the content and character of religious education, and demands for state 
support to establish separate schools with a curriculum and ethos supportive of 
community values and beliefs.
6
   In the light of these concerns both Deveaux and 
Shachar hold that respect for the actual values and commitments of minorities entails 
that educational provisions must be subject to the principles of deliberation and power 
sharing. Indeed Deveaux is explicitly critical of liberal conceptions of autonomy that 
require the rejection of religious schooling that reinforces traditional sexual roles.
7
 
The potential difficulties inherent in such a position are exemplified in Shachar‟s 
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attempt to apply the principles of transformative accommodation to the area of 
religious education. Under Shachar‟s proposals, religion is to be treated as an 
educational sub-matter alongside civic education. While the state controls the civic 
education component, religious minorities are allowed to determine the nature and 
content of religious education classes. Although children from different 
denominational groups attend the same school and share the same civic education, for 
the purpose of religious instruction classes (normally two to three hours per week) 
students are broken up into different classes according to their religious affiliation. 
This allocation of authority is to be accompanied by a series of choice options. Not 
only should it be possible to „opt in‟ and „opt out‟ of religious education, to address 
potential conflicts between the commitments and educational ethos that underpins the 
civic curriculum and tenets central to the values of religious minorities Shachar 
proposes „opt in‟ and „opt out‟ choices across a range of subjects of instruction.  
 
Granting religious communities control over the content of a limited number of 
religious education classes within the context of an overwhelmingly state controlled 
civic education would arguably not unduly impinge upon women‟s capacity to 
develop a broad range of skills and capabilities. However such a limited proposal is 
unlikely to satisfy many religious communities who have persistently expressed 
concern regarding the overall ethos of their children‟s education. Yet, to permit in the 
face of such concerns a broad range of „opt out‟ options, as proposed by Shachar, or 
to uphold the right to a religious schooling that reinforces traditional gender roles as 
advocated by Deveaux, runs the risk of undermining one of the key background 
conditions that will enable women to become effective participants in the institutional 
processes that are key to the participation strategy. For example, if the exercise of the 
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general choice options proposed by Shachar is left in the hands of parents, some may 
wish to withdraw their children from any aspect of the curriculum that potentially 
challenges their religious commitments. This could affect a very broad range of 
curricular matters. Indeed „even the most basic forms of liberal civic education give 
rise to complaints‟ (Macedo, 1995: 470). For example in the case of Mozert v. 
Hawkins (1983) „born again‟ Christian families in Tennessee argued that a primary 
school reading programme designed to present children with a variety of religious 
perspectives denigrated the truth of their beliefs by presenting material in an even-
handed and uncommitted fashion.
8
 Faced with such worries Shachar may, of course, 
wish to argue that general educational choice options should only be instituted once 
pupils themselves are capable of exercising them. Indeed her only example of a 
potential general educational opt out, sex education, suggests that this may well be 
what she has in mind. If this is so, Shachar‟s proposals regarding religious education 
imply that from the age of 14 onwards students should be able to determine for 
themselves whether or not to exercise their right to opt out. However, it is doubtful 
whether children who are still economically dependant on their parents would indeed 
be able to make free choices. Given the typical power relations within families there 
must surely be a real danger that children will be subject to both informal and formal 
parental pressures to „choose‟ in accordance with their parents‟ wishes and cultural 
expectations.  
 
The difficulties associated with Shachar‟s and Deveaux‟s positions regarding 
education highlight the general tension inherent in their overall strategy between, on 
the one hand, the desire to respect the actual values and beliefs of participants in 
institutional processes and, on the other hand, the commitment to empower women to 
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challenge the existing power relations within their community. Although the emphasis 
on internal debate and contestation and the desire not to preclude non-liberal 
outcomes sits well with the aims and aspirations of many indigenous feminists 
movements, ultimately both Deveaux and Shachar fail to adequately define the 
background conditions that need to be met for women to be effective actors within the 
institutional frameworks central to the participation strategy.  
 
Resources, Participation and Agency  
While the difficulties that surround the authentic choice model suggest that 
proponents of the participation strategy are right to be weary of attempts to cash out 
agency in terms of expressly liberal values such as personal autonomy or authentic 
choices, they typically underestimate the impact of their proposals upon the very 
background conditions they invoke to ensure that women develop the capacities for 
effective participation. In pluralist liberal democracies worries about adaptive 
preferences may well have less purchase. However, once the institutional mechanisms 
favoured by advocates of the participation strategy such as Deveaux and Shachar are 
applied across the wide range of potentially contested issues, the ensuing policies may 
well alter the background conditions in such societies in ways that may undermine 
rather than enhance women‟s capacity for agency. In this context the potential 
difficulties inherent in the models developed by Shachar and Deveaux are by no 
means confined to issues surrounding education, but may impact upon a host of 
structural inequalities, such as financial independence and economic security. For 
example, if minorities are simply left to negotiate rules regarding inheritance and 
divorce within the context of Deveuax‟s purely procedural deliberative framework, 
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there is no guarantee that the ensuing policies will indeed protect women‟s economic 
interests. Similarly, while in her discussion of marriage and divorce, Shachar 
envisages that under transformative accommodation the state would retain control 
over economic and custodial matters, minorities presented with the opportunity to 
exercise joint governance may not endorse such a division of jurisdictional authority. 
In the absence of a theoretical framework that clearly distinguishes between 
constitutional essentials and practices, rights and entitlements that can be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the minority group, Shachar cannot guarantee that the allocation of 
jurisdictional authority will follow a particular pattern. While Shachar‟s proposed 
system of selective choice options offers additional protections for women, there 
remains a real risk that the initial allocation of jurisdictional authority will have a 
detrimental impact upon the background conditions such as education, economic 
security and financial independence that enable women to make effective use of the 
option of selective exit.  
 
These worries suggest that ultimately proponents of the participation strategy cannot 
entirely sidestep the complex questions surrounding women‟s capacity for agency that 
are central to the authentic choice model. If women are to make effective use of the 
opportunities for democratic participation proposed by Deveaux or the selective 
choice option advocated by Shachar, they must be able to develop the capabilities and 
capacities that enable them to be effective political agents. In this regard proponents 
of the authentic choice model such as Nussbaum (1999) and Friedman (2003) point 
quite rightly to education and financial independence as important goals for women. 
This is not to dismiss the serious difficulties associated with the substantive liberal 
values inherent in the authentic choice model. On the contrary, rather than frame the 
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background conditions that delimit the scope of institutional mechanisms for 
deliberation or power sharing in terms of autonomy or authentic choice, feminists 
attracted to the participation strategy may well find it more useful to engage with 
alternative approaches that draw upon long-standing feminist concerns regarding 
economic equality and access to resources. These concerns continue to play an 
important role in the work of feminist theorists such as Nancy Fraser (2003). Indeed 
the difficulties which beset even sophisticated models of the participation strategy 
lend weight to Fraser‟s call for a need to reconnect recent feminist discourses 
regarding recognition and representation with previous feminist concerns relating to 
social and economic equality. As Fraser rightly notes, both maldistribution and 
misrecognition can undermine women‟s capacity to participate on par with others in 
political institutions. To address the complex interaction between maldistribution and 
misrecognition Fraser (2004:127) proposes a broad and capacious conception of 
justice centred around the principle of parity of participation, which stipulates that 
„justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to 
interact with one another as peers’. In this context Fraser (2003:36) distinguishes 
between the objective conditions of participatory parity, which „preclude forms and 
levels of economic dependence and inequality that impede parity of participation‟ and 
intersubjective conditions of participatory parity, which prohibit „institutionalised 
norms that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities 
associated with them‟. While the former requires redistribution, the latter is to be 
addressed through recognition. As Fraser (2004:140) rightly notes, although 
maldistribution and misrecognition are „thoroughly imbricated‟ and impact upon one 
another in a variety of ways, these two dimensions cannot simply be collapsed into 
one another. On the contrary „each dimension has some relative independence from 
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the other‟ (Fraser: 2007: 26). Thus „gender maldistribution is not simply a by-product 
of status hierarchy – nor is gender misrecognition wholly a by-product of economic 
structure‟ (Fraser: 2007: 26). For example, oppression can be social and psychological 
as well as economic and even comparatively well-off women can potentially be as 
seriously oppressed as those who lack economic power.
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  By the same token the 
eradication of social and psychological oppression in itself is unlikely to be sufficient 
to overcome economic inequality. A commitment to gender equality, therefore, 
requires both redistribution and recognition.  
 
This account of the interplay between recognition and redistribution combined with 
Deveaux‟s and Shachar‟s sophisticated analysis of the complex relationship between 
gender equality and cultural justice can arguably provide the foundations for a more 
nuanced and carefully delineated statement of the participation strategy that is 
sensitive to the need to secure the background conditions essential to women‟s 
capacity for effective political agency. The institutional mechanisms advocated by 
Deveaux and Shachar are clearly well placed to address what Fraser terms the 
intersubjective conditions of participatory parity. Indeed, the manner in which 
Deveaux and Shachar combine a degree of self-governance for minorities with 
mechanisms that enable women to challenge existing power relations and dominant 
interpretations of norms and values echoes Fraser‟s (2004:138) preference for non-
reformist reform; that is to say policies that have  
„a double face: on the one hand, they engage people‟s identity and satisfy 
some of their needs as interpreted within existing frameworks of recognition 
and distribution, on the other hand, they set in motion a trajectory of change in 
which more radical reforms become practicable over time‟.10   
 
Moreover, the sophisticated institutional models proposed by Deveaux and Shachar 
offer important insights into how to secure genuine recognition for women within 
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their own cultural traditions that are absent from Fraser‟s analysis. Although Fraser 
recognises the need to critically evaluate the impact of claims for cultural recognition 
upon participatory parity at intra-group level, she fails to systematically explore the 
complex interplay between conceptions of gender equality and culture. Thus, while 
Fraser acknowledges that such judgements require democratic processes of public 
debate, she fails to explore the extent to which intragroup participatory parity is 
depended upon the development of participatory mechanisms specifically designed to 
facilitate the development of culturally sensitive conceptions of gender equality.
11
 For 
example, in her discussion of the French controversy surrounding the foulard Fraser 
(2007) is sympathetic to the argument that the meaning of the scarf is highly contested 
and that the foulard should therefore not simply be seem as a marker of women‟s 
subordination. However, she offers no guidance on how such processes of 
contestation can be brought to bear to facilitate the development of culturally sensitive 
conceptions of gender equality and to secure genuine recognition for women within 
their own cultural traditions. In this regard the mechanisms proposed by Deveaux and 
Shachar constitute a welcome addition to Fraser‟s analysis. However these 
mechanisms will only be effective if the background conditions are safeguarded that 
enable women to make good use of opportunities to challenge existing power 
relations. Here Fraser‟s emphasis on the objective conditions of participatory parity 
highlights the importance of economic security and independence as a vital pre-
requisite for effective democratic agency. As Fraser rightly notes, maldistribution and 
misrecognition can neither be insulated from each other nor can one be reduced to the 
other and policies designed to secure recognition are unlikely to succeed in the 
absence of a firm focus on the economic factors that can secure the objective 
conditions for parity of participation. Thus, just as policy analysts have argued that 
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„the surest way to raise poor women‟s status in developing countries is to provide 
them access to paid work (Fraser 2004: 141), so arguably one of the best ways of 
ensuring that women‟s voices are heard in participatory forums is to make sure that 
women enjoy economic security and independence. This suggests that rather than 
cash out the background conditions for democratic agency in terms of autonomy or 
authentic choice, proponents of the participatory strategy should focus on the 
conditions that ensure that all participants enjoy adequate financial security and 
economic independence. Once these objective conditions of participatory parity are 
addressed, the models proposed by Deveaux and Shachar are arguably well placed to 
enable women to challenge existing power relations and established interpretations of 
norms and values within their own communities. Furthermore, since access to 
economic resources can quite readily be measured, a focus on economic independence 
arguably avoids the most serious methodological difficulties inherent in any attempt 
to determine whether or not a woman‟s particular choices meet the conditions of 
autonomy or authenticity. Such an approach would, for instance, entail ensuring that 
women have access to an education that enables them to acquire marketable skills 
rather than the more complex and far-reaching goal of educating for autonomy.  
 
This approach has important implications for both the scope of the participatory 
strategy and the relationship between such mechanisms for empowering minority 
women and wider feminist struggles for gender equality. Although Deveaux 
acknowledges that a commitment to equal political participation may well require 
state intervention to address structural inequalities such as economic deprivation and 
lack of education, neither she nor Shachar recognise the limits such pre-requisites set 
for the scope of the participatory mechanisms they advocate. While an emphasis on 
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financial security and economic independence falls well short of the rather demanding 
conditions for democratic participation implicit in Nussbaum‟s and Friedman‟s 
authentic choice model, it none the less implies that the liberal framework that both 
Deveaux and Shachar presume as a backdrop to their approach will need to be more 
substantive and the scope for democratic deliberation and joint governance more 
limited than either theorist acknowledges. Not only will the influence of minorities 
over questions of education have to be limited to ensure that all women can acquire a 
broad range of marketable skills, the state will have to retain control over issues 
which can impact directly upon women‟s financial security and economic 
independence. Thus, for example, on this account, financial and custodial issues 
relating to questions of marriage and divorce or rules regarding inheritance and 
property ownership fall outside the scope of the issues that can be determined via 
participatory mechanisms and democratic deliberation within minority groups. The 
liberal state has an obligation to secure for all citizens the objective conditions of 
parity of participation and must therefore ensure that women‟s economic interests in 
these areas are protected. This, of course, still leaves considerable scope for 
disagreements regarding the role of women that can be settled through institutional 
mechanisms such as Deveaux‟s model of democratic deliberation or Shachar‟s 
proposals for joint governance. However, such mechanisms will operate within a 
distinctly liberal framework, explicitly designed to safeguard the independence of all 
participants. This is not to suggest that current provisions in western liberal 
democracies adequately safeguard the needs of all women in this regard.   Rather it 
places the question of empowering women within minority communities within the 
context of wider feminist struggles in liberal democracies for greater economic 
equality and financial security for women in general.  
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What emerges from this analysis is a three-dimensional conception of empowering 
minority women, which incorporates redistribution, recognition and representation.
12
 
While the redistributive dimension links the struggles of minority women to wider 
feminist campaigns for financial security and economic equality for women in 
general, the dimension of recognition highlights the „cultural discursive‟ aspect of 
gender and the complex interactions between conceptions of gender equality and 
cultural values and norms. Whereas the former aims to secures the background 
conditions that ensure that all women enjoy the independence vital for effective 
political agency, the latter highlights the need for mechanisms that enable  minority 
women to exercise this political agency to develop culturally sensitive conceptions of 
gender equality that are attuned to their needs, values and commitments. Finally, the 
representational dimension draws attention to the political processes and decision-
making procedures that „frame‟ the issues that affect women‟s lives. In this context 
the work of proponents of the participation strategy such as Deveaux and Shachar 
rightly highlights the importance of new democratic forums that can offer an effective 
remedy to the dangers of „misframing‟ that can occur when majority evaluative and 
decision-making processes are employed to address contentious issues regarding 
gender equality within minority cultural communities. If the needs and aspiration of 
minority women are not be misconstrued, minority women must be empowered to 
make their voices heard. Indeed once carefully delineated and placed within a 
distinctly liberal framework designed to safeguard women‟s economic security and 
independence, the participatory mechanisms championed by Deveaux and Shachar are 
well placed to empower  women to challenge existing power relations within their 
cultural traditions and to develop distinctive, culturally sensitive conceptions of 
gender equality. 
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Conclusion 
The difficulties that beset even sophisticated accounts of the authentic choice strategy, 
such as the models advocated by Nussbaum and Friedman point to significant 
methodological problems inherent in any appeal to the conditions of choice as a 
strategy for empowering women within their own cultural traditions. In the light of 
these concerns feminists may wish to shift their focus from attempts to define the 
background conditions that enable women to freely endorse or reject existing cultural 
roles and practices to the social and political processes that define and articulate these 
cultural roles and expectations. While the participation strategy proposed by writers 
such as Deveaux and Shachar promises to provide new institutional mechanisms that 
enable women to challenge existing power relations and the dominant interpretations 
of norms and values that define their cultural communities, women will only be able 
to make good use of such opportunities for participation if they have been able to 
develop the capacities and capabilities that enable them to be effective political 
agents. These worries suggest that proponents of the participation strategy will not be 
able to entirely avoid the complex questions regarding the background conditions that 
facilitate women‟s agency central to the authentic choice model. None the less the 
serious difficulties associated with attempts to cash out agency by an appeal to 
distinctly liberal values such as personal autonomy or authentic choices cannot be 
readily dismissed. In their search for an alternative account of the background 
conditions that secure women‟s agency, feminists attracted to the participation 
strategy may find it helpful to re-engage with long-standing feminist concerns with 
economic equality and access to resources. Such an approach entails a three 
dimensional conception of empowering minority women, which incorporates 
redistribution, recognition and representation. While the redistributive dimension 
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secures the background conditions for effective political agency and links the question 
of empowering women within their own cultural traditions to wider feminist struggles 
for economic equality, the recognition strand highlights the need for culturally 
sensitive conceptions of gender equality.  Finally the representative dimension aims to 
ensure that minority women can give effective political expression to their own 
aspirations and concerns. While such an approach falls short of the demanding 
conditions for democratic participation implicit within the authentic choice model, it 
none the less places significant limits on the issues that can be settled solely by an 
appeal to democratic participation.  
                                                 
Endnotes 
1
 For critiques of Friedman‟s account of conditions for authentic choice see, for example, Narayan 
(2002), Mackenzie (2007) and Deveaux (2007). For critiques of this aspect of Nussbaum‟s capabilities 
approach see, for example, Deneulin (2002), Phillips (2001) and Wolff (1995).  
2
 While Deneulin develops this critique in the context of her discussion of Sen‟s capability approach, it 
arguably applies just as much to Nussbaum‟s model. 
3
 For a critique of Nussbaum‟s analysis of the choices of women who endorse life-styles that limit their 
autonomy see Phillips (2001) and Wolff (1995).  
4
 On this point also see Benhabib 2002. 
5
 As Okin (2005) notes, Deveaux‟s formal criteria for democratic participation may be read to favour a 
much more interventionist stance. On such a reading the principle of equality entails careful attention 
to who is to act as a representative and how representatives are chosen, while the principle of non-
domination is taken to require wide-ranging intervention in the family and women‟s position in society. 
While critics like Okin may welcome such an expansive reading and the extensive intervention 
associated with it, it cannot be readily reconciled with Deveaux‟s aim to offer a procedural account of 
democratic deliberation that respects the values of participants and engages with their strategic 
interests. A minimalist reading of the formal criteria of democratic participation is more compatible 
with Deveaux‟s overall goals than the strong reading favoured by Okin.  
6
 For detailed critical discussions see, for example, Macedo (1995) and Barry (2001). 
7
 In this context Deveaux (2007) explicitly rejects Marylin Friedman‟s account of procedural 
autonomy. 
8
 For a discussion of this case see Macedo (1995).    
9
  I like to thank Monica Mookherjee for this example.  
10
 Fraser regards non-reformist reforms as a potentially valuable tool for resolving the difficulties and 
tensions that surround both affirmative and transformative strategies.  While affirmative strategies „aim 
to correct inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying social 
structures that generate them‟, transformative strategies expressly aim to restructure the „underlying 
generative framework‟ (Fraser 2004:133). Although transformative strategies avoid the  risk of reifying 
collective identities associated with affirmative strategies, calls for the restructuring of the underlying 
social framework often appear remote from the immediate concerns of those who suffer from 
maldistribution or misrecognition. Fraser contents that in practice this distinction between affirmative 
and transformative strategies is not absolute and that non-reformist reforms can be employed to 
generate policies, which, while accessible to those who suffer from maldistribution and misrecognition, 
avoid the dangers of reification.  
11
 Fraser (2007: 31) argues that in cases where demands for the recognition of minority cultural 
practices appear to be at odds with the demands of gender justice the principle of participatory parity 
must be applied at both the inter and the intra group level. Thus „claimants must show, first, that the 
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institutionalization of majority cultural norms denies them participatory parity and, second, that the 
practices whose recognition they seek do not themselves deny participatory parity to others, as well as 
to some of their own members‟.   
12
 This tripartheit conceptualisation draws on and adapts Fraser‟s  (2005) distinctions. In contrast to the 
definition of „misframing‟ adopted here, Fraser‟s (2005: 305) work focuses on questions of 
transnational justice and the potentially pernicious effects that can arise when the „state territorial frame 
is imposed on transnational sources of injustice‟. 
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